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PRESENT LEGAL AND PRACTICAL METHODS
BY WHICH BUSINESS CUSTOM IS
ENFORCED*
E. KARL McGINNIS**
"The old order changeth yielding place to new,
And God fulfills Himself in many ways
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world."
We are here concerned with those common practices which the
common law has not yet accredited as reasonable. This lag or gap
of unapproved practices is frequently deplored by business men and
by lawyers. PerhapF in reality this gap is fortunate and necessary.
Obeying the laws of physics all matter contracts with cold, water
included, but at 320 above zero, Fahrenheit, water breaks away
from this universal rule and expands. Upon this one mysterious
phenomenon all life depends. In our society this gap of unapproved
and disapproved customs supplies an expansion joint providing a
flexibility that is an aid to growth and progress. Furthermore, it
is important that we have orderly machinery for tolerating unapproved and even disapproved customary practices. For men can
appraise customary practices more wisely than they can appraise
mere prospected theories. We can better judge the reasonable value
of what has been done than of what may be done.
What are the devices that constitute the orderly machinery for
tolerating the customary practices which comprise the gap. First,
there is the device of slightly changing the nature of the act to
accomplish the desired purpose and yet make it legal-the alchemy
of the lawyer that converts the prohibited into the enforcible. Consider the several million automobiles that have been sold for notes
that will be paid, many of them collected in court, and with all interest, for legally those notes are not usurious. A skillful lawyer has
seen to it that they are not usurious. And yet have not men who
* At the meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Chicago,
December 1925, the Round Table Conference on Commercial Law discussed
"The Introduction of Business Customs to Alter Fixed Rules of Law." Pro-

fessor Max Radin of the University of California presented a paper on the
historical side of the question and Professor Austin Tappan Wright of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School a paper on the "Opposition of the
Law to Business Usages," published in 26 Columbia L. Rev. 917. This article
is in substance a paper presented at the same time.
** Professor of Business Administration, University of Texas, Austin,
Texas.

PRESENT LEGAL AND PRACTICAL METHODS 137
had the use of money for sale really sold it to yield from 10% to
20% per annum? With ten million Ford cars making America safe
for democracy when otherwise there might have been but five
million, perhaps in time some legislature may decide that those business men are reasonable in acting on the assumption that money
and credit may be sold at the market and that risk is a fair element
of the value of credit just as quality is an element of the value of
cotton. If such a time comes automobile financing and subdivision
financing will be slightly simpler but not fundamentally different.
The repeal of all usury laws would not materially increase the
amount of money now available for these activities.
In many situations where the lawyer is able to save his client
whole before the law both the lawyer and the business man must
bear the stigma of professional and popular disapproval while in
other situations these subterfuges have the full approval of the court.
Concerning the creation of trusts to reduce income tax on the highly
profitable sale of property a court says, "The acts of the company
in dissolving and forming a trust were not illegal or a fraud on
the government but a prudent business act. It is not made illegal
because the motive impelling the change is to reduce or avoid taxation."'
A second device is to permit the exercise of executive and administrative discretion in order to get around statutory requirements in
cases where business exigencies must be yielded to. This is a dangerous subject to discuss here or anywhere, yet there is some truth
in the loose statement that laws are made to be broken. Recall the
letter of President Roosevelt to Attorney General Bonaparte written
at the instigation of Mr. Gary concerning the purchase of the
Tennessee Coal Company to prevent the precipitation of a financial
panic.
A third method of enforcing business custom is the organization
of groups of individuals with common interests, such as the Labor
Unions, Trade Associations, Commodities and Securities Exchanges.
There is nothing new or alarming in the influence which these Associations have in moulding and enforcing custom. The law has long
shared with other institutions the responsibility of regulating conduct. The family and the church have been factors aiding the law
in maintaining an orderly society. These associations have borne
' Magazine of Wall Street, Vol. 36, p. 1086.

138

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

the brunt of adapting life's action to the changed conditions created
by economic revolutions. A system of law based on precedent is
too slow and cumbersome to be relied on exclusively. Each of these
groups of associations has made a contribution. Unions have obtained for labor a more equitable share of the wealth it produces,
and have improved working conditions, when the courts would not
have enforced these agreements among themselves that made mass
bargaining possible. The commodity exchanges have created a constant cash market, appraised scarcity values, and contributed toward
the orderly marketing of the nation's surplus production. In some
places, certain customs of the trade have been merely unapproved.
In other jurisdictions some of the customs have been expressly
prohibited.
The extent of the organization of trade associations and the
general scope of their activities is familiar to all. It is significant
that the elimination of waste in industry procured by Mr. Hoover
has been accomplished by the friendly co6peration of these associations. It has been accomplished by education and not by compulsion.
A fourth method of enforcing business custom is the very obvious
method of making the custom legal. All other methods have their
limitations and should always be considered merely as interim devices.
As was stated in the beginning, a lag of unapproved customs is
necessary and beneficial, but if this margin becomes more than just
enough to guarantee flexibility, it becomes a disintegrating force.
If the law continually refuses to sanction and aid in enforcing customs, which the business man feels are just, beneficial and necessary,
those men will have an increasing disrespect for the law, and will
devise means of carrying on without the aid of the law. Thus,
ifidustry will lose much of the benefit of the wisdom which the
science of law has to contribute. This is right now apparent in the
application of commercial arbitration. Having lost sympathy and
some of their respect for the law, and having devised means of
being partly independent of the law, certain business interests are
making the mistake of using the machinery of commercial arbitration for the settlement of disputes where it is wholly inadequate.
Our problem is confused by the fact that these ostracized customs
are neither all bad nor all good. They consist of the vestige of
man's animal barbarity and of the forming embodiment of man's
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hopes. Necessity often makes strange colleagues. It is unwise that
constructive business interests should be forced to co~perate intimately and compromisingly with contamination, with thieves and
bomb throwers to accomplish their ends. Business men and jurists
alike should be alert to keep the group of ostracized customs small
and both should be alert to secure the stamp of legal approval for
those customs which have proved reasonable.
Professor Commons states that the science of law has added to
the fundamental concepts of economics, the concept of reasonable
value. 2 Law contributes the measurement of reasonableness. The
assimilation by the law of extraneous customs merely involves the
application to new customs of the measurement of reasonableness.
Our system of law has fairly definitely designated the appropriate
persons to judge the reasonableness of customs. In some instances,

it may require merely a judicial decision, in others, legislative action
or a constitutional amendment.
It is appropriate for a greater proportion of this growth to occur
in judicial decisions. Justice Holmes states "The very considerations
which judges most rarely mention, and always with an apology, are
the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life-I
mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned. Every important principle which is developed by
litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less definitely
understood views of public policy, most generally, to be sure, under
our practice and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive
preferences and inarticulate conviction, but none the less traceable
to views of public policy in the last analysis." 3 President Wilson
once said, "Have we come to a time when the only way to change a
law is by statute. The changing of law by statute seems to me like
mending a garment with a patch, whereas, as law should grow by
the life that is in it, not by the life that is outside of it-I should
hate to think that the law did not derive its impulse from looking
forward rather than from looking backward, or rather that it did
not derive its instruction from looking about and seeing what the
circumstances of men actually are, and what the impulses of justice
necessarily are."' 4
'Law and Economics, 34 Yale L. Jour. 371, 379.
'Holmes, The Common Law, p. 36.
' Remarks at the annual convention of the American Bar Association oru
October 20. 1914.
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This is a complex age. In the practical application of any science,
we find that the various sciences are inter-dependent. No single
science is self-sufficient. In the conduct of a large investment banking business, reliance is placed upon the opinions of a specialized
lawyer, a consulting engineer, an economist, a statistical expert and
others. Many of these experts are permanent members of the staff.
Is law a self-sufficient science? Can the reasonableness of a vital
business custom be adequately appraised solely by an understanding
of what is written in the law books? Is it appropriate in valuing a
business custom to investigate the background of the reason why
they do it? Mr. Brandeis, as attorney in Muller v. Oregon,5 devoted
most of his effort to a study of the background of the conditions
under which people live; to a study of human endurance, to a study
of the social consequences of violating certain physical laws. Mr.
Sapiro, in his brief and argument, before the Supreme Court of
Texas, in the Texas Farm Bureau v. Stovall,6 pictured the living
conditions of existing distributive institutions, and gave factual
experience of the co6peratives in the citrus and tobacco industries.
Let us illustrate the legalizing of custom by court assimilation.
The State of Illinois has passed an extreme statute making void
certain contracts in regard to future trading and entirely out of
harmony with established custom in their great grain market. By a
series of judicial decisions, most of the practices were gradually
approved, so that the amended statute of 1913 was virtually a codification of existing judicial decisions. 8
Consider another situation. Professor Nathan Isaacs has been
studying the relation between the automobile manufacturer and his
distributor. 9 The business world calls it an agency-the lawyer is
instantly certain that it is not an agency. It is, perhaps, a relation
sui generis, similar to the relation which men have devised for
present industrial conditions, but a relation which the law has not
yet accurately classified. The automobile manufacturer exercises a
control over his distributor, which the law does not entirely sanction
'Muller v. Oregon (1908) 208 U. S. 412, 52 L. Ed. 551.
' Texas Farm Bureau v. Stovall (1923) 113 Tex. 273, 253 S. W. 1101.
Schneider v. Turner (1889) 130 Ill. 28, 22 N. E. 497; First National Banlk
v. Miller (1908) 235 Ili. 135, 85 N. E. 312.

'Judson, Validity of Transactions on the Board of Trade, 19 I1. L. Rev.
644.
1Isaacs, Agents and Agency, Harvard Business Review, April, 1925.
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by a vendor over his vendee, yet it is a control which the law does
sanction by a principal over his agent. Dean Pound has expressed
himself that it would be proper for a court to classify this relation,
that is, in this case it would be proper for a court to pass upon the
reasonableness of the prevailing custom. Is it appropriate for that
court to look outside of law books into the industrial world, to study
the conditions which are responsible for this custom? The judge
would learn that the kernel of the agreement is not the purchase and
sale of so many pounds of metal, it is the purchase of years or miles
or ton miles of service. Today, the ultimate consumer buys a name
plate and a business policy of the manufacturer that protects the
name plate, plus an expectancy that the manufacturer will be able
and willing to protect that name plate. Not one business man in a
thousand is competent to buy an automobile or a truck on his own
judgment of the machine. New customs are the result of new conditions. The law should be interested in understanding the conditions, before granting or withholding approval of the customs.
But all growth cannot be by judicial decision. Justice Holmes
who is an advocate of the growth of the law through the court says
in a dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York,' 0 "This case is
decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country
does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with
that theory, I should desire to study it further and long, before
making up my mind. But I do not concede that to be my duty,
because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has
nothing to do with the right of the majority to embody their opinions
in law." Justice Holmes holds that when a legislature acting within
constitutional limitations has pronounced upon the reasonableness
of a practice in the light of their opinion of an economic theory, a.
judge should be bound by the opinion of the legislature.
In fact the lawyer for the trade association or specific interest is
more often inclined to underestimate the task involved in securing
approval for his custom. The lawyer understands the condition
out of which the custom has grown and is thoroughly convinced of
the justice and reasonableness of the custom. He.feels that no constitutional barrier is properly involved, that no legislative action
should be necessary and that a court should readily approve the
custom. Securing legal approval of a new custom is a grave task
0

Lochner v. New York (1905) 198 U. S. 45, 75, 49 L. Ed. 937.
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of social and political engineering. Often the courts and legislators
do not understand the business background of conditions that created
the custom. There are almost always vested interests strongly
intrenched. And finally, the thinking for the country is delegated
to such a small proportion of people because thinking is an onerous
task.
The following illustrations of the methods employed and the
comparative success in securing legal sanction for new customs may
prove of interest.
1. CITY ZONING

Zoning is perhaps not a custom. Certainly not in Texas, but
there was a crystalized desire that the law should give it sufficient
sanction to afford an opportunity for such a custom to develop. At
a time when the city of London was spending three million dollars
to straighten a little bend in the street, caused by the path made by
cows in walking around a tree stump, 600 years ago, the citizens of
Dallas wished to build a city after a plan which would avoid such
errors. Hastily without a careful study of legal questions involved
an ordinance was drawn providing for a rather arbitrary zoning.
The whole issue was tried and permanently settled on a case that
arose out of an application for a permit which was filed before the
-ordinance was passed.1 t After the Supreme Court had ruled against
the basic principles of the custom, the State Legislature passed an
enabling act, then by popular vote, the city amended its charter,
giving the commissioners the right to zone. A new zoning ordinance
was drawn, making the zoning less arbitrary which it was hoped
would cure the defect of the earlier ordinance. But all of this was
too late. The Supreme Court had taken a stand. Clearly an act
which was unconstitutional could not be validated by the passage of
a mere legislative act and now nothing short of a constitutional
amendment will permit zoning to be carried on in Texas. In most
other states, fortunately, the problem was approached with better
12
generalship and with an opposite result.
u Spann v. City of Dallas (1921) 111 Tex. 356, 235 S. W. 513.
" See the following articles: Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 Harv.
L. Rev. 834; Baker, The Constitutionalityof Zoning Laws, 20 Ill. L. Rev. 213;
21 Ill. L. Rev. 284; Chamberlain and Pierson, Zoning Laws and Ordinances,
10 A. B. A. Jour. 185.
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,2.

THE LEGALITY OF COOPERATIVE CONTRACTS

Contrast the movement to secure the legal approval of the custom
involved in co6perative marketing. The plan was first carried on
quietly for a number of years in a field where the existing marketing
machinery was most inefficient. Under the scant protection given a
tolerated, but unapproved custom, the plan was perfected and the
custom was crystalized. It became necessary to secure legal
approval. Congress was asked to appoint a sub-committee and a
large sum of money was appropriated to study conditions in the
agricultural industry and to study the comparative efficiency of
existing distribution machinery in agricultural production and in the
manufacturing industry. As a part of its findings, this congressional
committee reported that co6perative marketing was the most hopeful
remedy for what they considered unsatisfactory conditions. Then
the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce and the
President of the United States were induced to take up this message
of education about conditions that made a new custom necessary.
Then within the space of about a year, there were spread upon the
statute books of thirty-one states and of the federal government,
prolific acts which were almost identical. At that time some legal
authorities criticized those statutes as being entirely useless, as nothing but a codification of existing common law, or as the granting of
powers which no one had ever doubted existed, of powers which
the farmers had been exercising for 100 years. But these statutes
had their place in a campaign of education and, moreover, these
statutes also had a very definite legal purpose. It was several years
later before the courts were asked to enforce these contracts. There
was no haste. The public was given time to become acquainted with
this new custom. Then when the courts were in time asked to
enforce these contracts, the champions of the opposing vested interests demanded that this new hybrid contract be classified either a
contract of sale or a contract of agency. They were prepared to
prove that it was neither. But the courts had recourse on the statute,
saying that the legislature had authorized the making of this specific
contract, and that it was not necessary to determine whether it was
a contract of sale or a contract of agency.
The question of remedy also arose. No contract exactly like this
could be found in all the ancient books. It was genuinely doubtful
whether, according to all precedent, all of the prerequisites were
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present for granting specific performance. Again, in those states,
where the statutes covered the matter, the question was settled. The
statute expressly stated that the co6perative associations might specifically enforce the contract against the producer member. The net
result is that this new custom of using a new type of contract in
co~perative marketing has been almost unanimously approved by the
courts.1 s Ultimately, the custom may or may not prove to be economically sound. It will, however, have had sufficient legal sanction
to be given a fair opportunity to prove its worth.

Brown, Co-5perative Marketing of Tobacco, 1 N. C. L. Rev. 210, discussing Co~perativeAssociation v. Jones (1923) 185 N. C. 265, 117 S. E. 174.
See also a note on Coaperative Marketing in North Carolina, 2 N. C. L.
Rev. 188; Ballantine, Coeperative Marketing Associations, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 1;
Henderson, Codperative Marketing Associations, 23 Col. L. Rev. 91.

